Regular order, Mr. Chairman. This is not a point of order.

Reserving the right to object, I think we should proceed in regular order.

I object.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just to nail down that

last colloquy, Mr. Cox, it is your testimony that the light-water reactor

that we are subsidizing can, when developed, produce 100

bombs a year? Is that correct?

And you said that the threatened nuclear facility,

I believe the Yongbyon facility, had it come on line, could have produced

only 12 bombs per year. Is that accurate?

The testimony that Dr. Perry gives us says that

‘‘those nuclear facilities remain frozen.’’ Is that accurate?

. Is it correct then to say that we have a comparison

between the freezing of the facility that could create 12 bombs

a year as a plus, weighed against the bringing on line of the facility

that can produce 100 bombs a year as a minus?

. I will certainly ask that same question of Dr. Perry.

Second, we have the GAO report regarding North Korea monitoring

of food aid, and——

. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute?

Mr. Chairman, could I see a copy of that statement

to which Mr. Cox referred? Maybe you could just arrange to

give a copy to me, so I could quote accurately.

No, I just ask to see a copy to quote it accurately.

I suspect then, and let me pursue this before I get to food aid, if

the Pyongyang facility has been frozen and there are 7 to 8 years

before the light-water reactors come on stream, then a possible argument

in favor of the Administration policy might be that it has

postponed from such time as Yongbyon may have come on until 7

to 8 years from now the availability of weapons-grade fissionable

material. Would that be correct?

. How long do you know or would you estimate,

and this can be to Mr. Knollenberg as well, before the Yongbyon

facility would have come on stream, had its development not been

frozen?

Mr. Knollenberg, do you know?

. Last, monitoring of food aid is criticized strongly

by the GAO. Can either of you speak to what argument or defense

North Korea makes for not permitting the International World

Food Program to monitor food aid?

The gentleman’s time has expired. Mr. Pomeroy.

Under the unanimous consent request, the gentleman

from Massachusetts proceeds.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Perry, I need to

understand a bit more of the technological differences between the

light-water reactors that are being supplied and what had been

threatened at the time of our 1994 Agreement.

You may have heard my colloquy with Congressman Cox. If not,

I asked him to provide me with the cites, the reference to which

he was citing. So I would now like to supply that to you with apologies

that I didn’t know of it before a few moments ago.

The Stockholm Institute of Peace Research indicated in a 1996

report entitled ‘‘Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium,’’ page

307, that under the 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea will not

produce any more plutonium until its light-water reactors operate,

no sooner than 7 to 8 years. After the LWRs, which I infer is lightwater

reactors, startup, ‘‘North Korea will accumulate plutonium in

spent fuel at the rate of about 490 kilograms per year. Because this

quantity is so large, North Korea will need to provide nuclear

transparency to ensure that diversion does not occur.’’

Congressman Cox’s testimony was that 490 kilograms per year

was an amount which could produce 100 bombs per year. This led

me to inquire of him and to tell him on the record that I would

then inquire of you, if this were a trade-off whereby North Korea

agreed to stop developing the Yongbyon facility in 1994, which

could produce, as your testimony gives us, 6 bombs per year, then

in return we are financing the development of light-water reactors

which within 7 to 8 years of the beginning of their construction,

would produce 100 bombs per year.

So you see my reason for inquiry. I would welcome your enlightenment

on that comparison, and I suppose the fundamental issue,

what is the spent fuel capacity of the light-water reactors that we

are financing?

Could you tell me what difficulties are encountered

in building such a processor and what assurances of monitoring

we would have that they, in fact, do not?

I am going to ask one last question, with the

Chairman’s indulgence to finish this line. Nevertheless, if it is true

that they have the technological ability to have built a processor

at Yongbyon, which I believe we both stipulate they did, and if

their light-water reactors will produce a substantial amount of

weapons-grade plutonium, or if I have got the wrong element you

may correct me——

Which task, however, is accomplishable by the

kind of facility that was built at Yongbyon, am I right?

Thank you. In closing, I want to say thanks to

both of you, particularly to Dr. Perry, who I have had the privilege

to know for a long time. I don’t know enough about this to make

any technological judgment, but I have no hesitation in my judgment

of your sincerity and patriotism in undertaking the task you

have, and I applaud you for it.

I do confess I am left with a bit of a quandary though. If we

through good will and all the right intentions have enhanced the

ability to produce weapons-grade material, we are then relying

upon an assurance that they will not make the processing plant

which we know they are capable of making. I wonder whether that

is a better deal than never to have assisted them in the production

of the fissionable material and simply tried to use what pressure

we could at Pyongyang.

Thank you.